In Part 1 we explored the content of Reagan’s speech and the national media’s relative disinterest in it. Delivered to a small segment of Central-East Mississippi, this brief address was heard by few. Yet, decades later, pundits cite this moment to explain twentieth-century American politics, attempting to link Republican electoral dominance with the nefarious racial politics of the alleged “Southern Strategy.” Without this, the Party Switch Myth has no connection to the modern Republican Party, since Reagan is an integral foundation. To make this tenuous connection, they must also ignore what Reagan and his team planned and executed during the first week of the general election campaign. The following is an excerpt from the upcoming book Dismantled: The Party Switch Myth.
After a day of rest, Reagan returned to his planned launch schedule and actual strategy on Tuesday, August 5th by meeting with civil rights leader Vernon Jordan, president of the Urban League.1 Jordan was recovering in a New York hospital from an assassination attempt, an event that shifted the schedule of Reagan's Urban League speech to after his Mississippi stop. Their meeting lasted 45 minutes, or three times the duration of the Neshoba speech.2
This visit and the ensuing week were part of a deliberate, strategic campaign involving hundreds of strategy sessions, dozens of consulting efforts, press releases, speechwriters, and coordination with long-term national party and election strategies. This was detailed by Reagan’s strategist Richard Wirthlin in a 176-page document that meticulously explained the 1980 campaign.3 The importance of these early campaign events was evident, and they were extensively covered by the national media.4
Nowhere in what would become known as Reagan’s campaign “black book” was the speech in Neshoba county, because it simply wasn’t part of the campaign strategy. It was done as a favor to local Republicans and rescheduled because of the attempt on Vernon Jordan’s life.5
After the Jordan meeting, Reagan delivered what his campaign deemed a "major address" to the civil rights organization. This 30-minute speech, double the length of the Neshoba event, was filled with specific policy proposals that articulated his strategic vision.6 With national media closely watching, Reagan addressed civil rights leaders and Urban League members, outlining his intentions and policy goals:
We are fighting literally for a generation of Americans. If we lose—if we fail to expand opportunities for young black Americans–then we are condemning them to that dismal cycle of poverty which so many of their parents had to endure.
There are three answers to this bleak future now confronting the upcoming generation of black Americans, and the bitter reality facing the older generations. Those answers are: jobs, jobs, jobs. [...]
[During 8 years as California Governor] we managed to increase the number of black state employees by 23 percent. As to those appointments a governor can make to executive and policymaking positions, I appointed more black citizens than all the previous governors of California combined.
Collection: Reagan, Ronald: 1980 Campaign Papers Folder Title: Press Section- [News Release]-08/05/1980 (National Urban League) Address Box: 562
Reagan added to these prepared remarks, “I am committed to the protection and enforcement of the civil rights of black Americans. This commitment is interwoven into every phase of the programs I will propose."7 Why has this event and clear pronouncement of principles disappeared from relevance?
After his address to the civil rights organization, Reagan toured the dilapidated areas of the South Bronx alongside the media, promising to create jobs where Carter had not.8 He then traveled to Chicago to meet executives from the nation's largest black-owned publishing firm, including EBONY and JET magazine.9 The campaign emphasized to the national media that these efforts were part of a broader strategy, “to make inroads in the black community.”10
What did Reagan tell the editorial board of JET and EBONY magazine during the over-hour-long meeting (more time spent in total at the Mississippi Fairgrounds)? JET reported in their August issue:11
Republican Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan, making his first Black media pitch for Black votes, told the editorial boards of JET and EBONY that if he is elected President, he will consider the appointment of Blacks to the U.S. Supreme Court and his cabinet.
Jet Magazine, 21 August 1980.
Aware of potential misinterpretations of his Mississippi speech, Reagan took care to clarify his positions, particularly about decentralizing federal programs:
[Reagan] emphasized that Blacks need not fear his proposal to transfer programs such as welfare and education from the federal government back to the states. Revealing that he has made a statement on this issue that upset one of his advisors [...]
Jet Magazine, 21 August 1980.
This indicates a concerted effort towards the public to clarify possible misconceptions and suggests that the editors at JET and EBONY were not even fully aware of the backdrop against which Reagan discussed these issues. Reagan’s campaign aimed to make his intentions unmistakably clear:
[Reagan:] “[...] we had a large section of our country in which there were no rights at all–voting rights or anything else–and was solidly in one political party. I don’t believe that was because of states’ rights. I believe that was because the federal government failed in its responsibility, because I think the federal government has this responsibility to insure the Constitutional rights of every citizen, wherever that citizen may be in this land. And for many years–and I was a New Deal Democrat–because the South voted solidly Democratic, the federal government just shut its eyes to the fact that Constitutional rights for a large segment of our society were being absolutely denied.
“To emphasize how strongly I feel about the responsibility of the federal government, I have said the federal government should do this at the point of bayonet, if necessary. [emphasis added]
“Sometimes I wonder how many people remember that the man who provided the bayonets to do that in Little Rock, Ark., was Dwight David Eisenhower–not one of the liberal Democrats,” Governor Reagan exclaimed.
Jet Magazine, 21 August 1980.
It’s difficult to be more clear and more emphatic. Who can still claim Reagan was making segregationist appeals to voters, and why persist with this narrative?
Reagan then met with Jesse Jackson at the Chicago office of his PUSH organization.12 AP characterized the initial days of Reagan's campaign as focused mainly on engaging black voters, stating, "focused primarily on black voters Tuesday in his first campaign trip since winning the Republican presidential nomination."13 It seems that the political reporting team at The Associated Press was unaware of any earlier campaign launch in Mississippi—because, officially, there wasn't one. The Reagan campaign embraced the ensuing headlines: “Reagan woos blacks, shuns KKK,”14 “Reagan’s busy day seeking black vote,”15 “Reagan Woos Blacks in Chicago, New York,”16 and “Reagan Is Praised By Jesse Jackson.”17 Indeed, Jesse Jackson voiced support for Reagan's campaign approach:
Four months ago, nobody wanted to make a move for the black vote. We were like lepers. What turned it around? Ronald Reagan. Reagan has shown that he’s interested and now, a competition has emerged for our votes. The most significant thing to happen so far, has been the moves that Ronald Reagan has made. That’s why Carter is talking about money for jobs and money for black colleges. It’s Reagan, there’s a real competition now.”
Daily News, 11 August 1980.
This was Jesse Jackson talking about Ronald Reagan. Jackson, who if anyone could discern racial issues in Reagan's early August campaign events, didn’t.
Curiously, The New York Times stood alone among national media outlets in framing Reagan's Neshoba County Fair speech within the context of "states' rights" and explicitly mentioning the phrase. The article, penned by seasoned journalist Douglas Kneeland and tucked away on page 11 of the Monday, August 4th edition, presented a perspective that diverged significantly from those offered by other major media sources, objectively making it an outlier.18
Editorials nationwide recognized Reagan’s distinct launch strategy, with headlines like, “Courting Blacks Into Fold High Priority For Reagan.”19
On August 4th, Lindy Washburn of AP covered the National Urban League conference under the headline, “Black Vote ‘Up for Grabs,’” quoting the keynote by League Executive Vice President John Jacob: “The black vote that elected Jimmy Carter in 1976 isn’t in anybody’s pocket in 1980,” he announced to the applause of 15,000 delegates.20 Jacob discussed the challenges facing black Americans, drawing on a recent survey after four years under Carter:21
[the survey] showed that one out of four heads of black households were unemployed, almost half of all blacks were worse off in 1980 than last year, and that two out of three black households were “losing the battle against inflation.”
The Central New Jersey News, 04 August 1980.
While the Reagan campaign harbored no illusions about capturing the majority of the black vote, their efforts were evident. Black columnist Carl Rowan reflected this in his piece titled “Reagan’s Black Votes: A Key Element?” concluding that “Mr. Reagan’s wooing of blacks may be more than a charade; it could be the key element in this election.” This flurry of press coverage and commentary came after the Mississippi event.22
Reagan's outreach to black voters was a consistent thread throughout his campaign, marked by national advertising campaigns aimed specifically at engaging the black electorate until election day.23
Reagan’s clear, obvious, and documented strategy of appealing to black America did not begin in August 1980. The Republican Party had devoted considerable funding and effort since 1976 to specifically target the black vote. The unambiguous effort by GOP National Chairman Bill Brock to recruit black Republican leaders was making headlines like this in the New York Times, “Jesse Jackson Tells Receptive G.O.P. It Can Pick Up Votes of Blacks:”24
Blacks will vote Republican if Republicans will go after their votes and look after their interests, the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson told the Republican National Committee today.
A standing ovation greeted the message from the Chicago‐based civil rights leader, who had been invited before the committee as part of an effort by the Republican national chairman, Bill Brock, to reverse the devastating decline in the party's share of black votes. [...]
Mr. Brock himself sketched in a news conference and in an interview some elements of a $640,000 [$3M in 2024] program he plans to win more black votes.
The New York Times, 21 January 1980.
A significant chunk of the GOP’s entire 1977 $9 million haul went towards this attempt.25
This clear strategy continued into the July 1980 Republican National Convention in Detroit, the most visible party event watched by roughly half of America’s TV viewers, nearly 80 million people. Perhaps this event had more impact than Reagan’s 15-minute unbroadcast speech in Central-East Mississippi.26
The RNC, to many the media's surprise, featured the Executive Director of the NAACP Benjamin Hooks who was welcomed with cheers as he gave a primetime nationally televised address. Reagan's aides worked behind the scenes to ensure Hooks would appear after Reagan was unable to speak at an earlier NAACP event. The NAACP leader ended his primetime RNC speech to a standing ovation as he called for, “a brotherhood and sisterhood from sea to shining sea.”27 Why ignore this?
Just before the DNC on August 10th, according to an AP-NBC News poll, Carter was behind Reagan by 25 points; 47% Reagan to 22% Carter. A month prior, before the RNC, the same poll had Reagan at 42% and Carter at 27%. Inflation reached a truly staggering 18% multiple times by the summer of 1980 (for context, 2023’s high inflation only reached 5%) and Democratic President Jimmy Carter was, incredibly, in danger of falling behind the third-party candidate John Anderson.28
Carter was hurting in the typically loyal black vote as well, ABC News/Harris Survey found Carter was polling at just 50% before the DNC. Down over 30 points from his 1976 level.29
Put simply, it wasn’t going great for the Carter camp in the summer of 1980. How would he close the gap to Reagan by November?
Part 1: The Truth about Reagan’s 1980 “States' Rights Speech—What did Reagan really say and what did America really hear?
Part 3: The Launch of Reagan’s “State’s Right’s Speech” Mythology—Carter’s Cynical Counter to Reagan’s strategy to win black voters.
Notes:
The Chicago Tribune, 05 August 1980.
Ibid.
Wirthlin, Richard., Hall, Wynton C.. The Greatest Communicator: What Ronald Reagan Taught Me About Politics, Leadership, and Life.
The El Paso Times, 05 August 1980.
Wirthlin, The Greatest Communicator.
Collection: Reagan, Ronald: 1980 Campaign Papers Folder Title: Press Section- [News Release]-08/05/1980 (National Urban League) Address Box: 562
The New York Times, 06 August 1980.
Ibid.
The Chicago Tribune, 05 August 1980.
Ibid.
Jet Magazine, 21 August 1980.
The Atlanta Constitution, 11 August 1980.
The Times, 06 August 1980.
Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 06 August 1980.
The Oakland Tribune, 06 August 1980.
The Times, 06 August 1980.
Omaha World-Herald, 06 August 1980.
The New York Times, 04 August 1980.
The Washington Star, 11 August 1980.
The Indianapolis News, 04 August 1980.
The Central New Jersey News, 04 August 1980.
The Pittsburgh Press, 08 August 1980.
Ebony Magazine, October 1980; Jet Magazine, November 1980.
The New York Times, 21 January 1980.
The New York Times, 15 January 1980.
The Sunday News, 17 August 1980.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 16 July 1980; 17 July 1980.
The San Bernardino County Sun, 26 March 1980.
Lindy Washburn, The Associated Press, 04 August 1980.